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     1 Introduction
In recent years there has been an increasing trend in research collaboration and technology
transfer between ￿rms and universities primarily resulting from the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act of
1980 and similar laws recently introduced in Europe and elsewhere (for surveys see, e.g.,
Poyago-Theotoky et al., 2002 and Siegel et al., 2007). This technology transfer has taken
a number of di⁄erent formats. Technology transfer o¢ ces (TTOs) in universities are a key
player in the commercialization process (Siegel et al., 2007) and act between industry and
university researchers in trying to ￿nd the most appropriate format for the technology trans-
fer to take place. A big chunk of technology transfer is e⁄ected via exclusive or non-exclusive
licensing of the patents acquired by university researchers (Phan and Siegel, 2006, Thursby
and Thursby, 2003, 2007) but not uniquely so. Other formats include university equity
holdings (Feldman et al., 2002), the creation of industry-university research centers (Adams
et al., 2001), spin-out companies (Franklin et al., 2001, Wright et al., 2006), research joint
ventures (Caloghirou et al., 2001, Link and Scott, 2005, Motohashi, 2005), start-ups (Powers
and McDougall, 2005) and the establishment of university research parks and incubators
(Link and Scott, 2007, Grimaldi and Grandi, 2005).
The vast majority of the literature on the topic is empirical or selective surveys (e.g., see
papers cited above). Nevertheless, to gain a deeper understanding of the issues involved in
technology transfer there is a concomitant need for theoretical analysis. A limited number of
theoretical approaches have been proposed to explain the recent trend of increased licensing
by universities and the role of the TTOs (Jensen and Thursby, 2001, Macho-Stadler et al.,
2007, 2008).
However, to the best of my knowledge, there is very little available in explaining the
options an innovating ￿rm has in pursuing technology transfer with a university. This
paper is an attempt to partially ￿ll this gap. In particular, by way of a simple model,
I try to explain the choice an innovating ￿rm has between licensing from the university
and entering into a joint venture with the university. As it is the innovating ￿rm that
makes the ￿rst move in deciding how to proceed in developing an innovation it makes sense
to concentrate on the two technology transfer options of licensing or entering into a joint
venture with the university.
2 The Model
Consider a simple set-up with one ￿rm (F) and one university1 (U) - both engage in research
activities. The ￿rm is aware that the university has created knowledge that may lead to
1e.g., this could be the technology transfer o¢ ce (TTO) or a university scientist.
1an innovation of value V following further development. This value can be thought of as a
generic value; how much worth the innovation is to society (e.g., the innovation could be a
new vaccine). The generic value V is an objective measure of the worth of the innovation;
it is not the same as e.g., the pro￿t that the ￿rm could earn from commercializing the
innovation, ￿, or the revenues that the university could obtain from licensing. The ￿rm has
the following options available: (i) it can engage in research on its own and develop the
innovation, (ii) it can engage in technology transfer with the university that has already
done research in the relevant area but there is a need for further development to make the
university￿ s discovery commercially viable. In this latter case there are two subcases: (a)
the ￿rm licenses the university￿ s discovery and undertakes further development or, (b) the
￿rm and the university work together on further development within a university-industry
research joint venture (U-I RJV thereafter). The ￿rm o⁄ers the university to cooperate and
the university either accepts or rejects this o⁄er. I model this situation as a sequential game,
as illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Di⁄erent outside options
The ￿rm￿ s objective is to maximize expected pro￿t. By contrast, the university is inter-
ested in the revenue associated with licensing, or, in sharing the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t from partici-
pating in the U-I RJV. In what follows, I present two versions of the game: (1) the case of
di⁄erent outside options for the two types of technology transfer and (2) the case where the
outside options are the same. Outside options refer to the options that the university has
when it declines the o⁄er of technology transfer by the ￿rm. The two versions are di⁄erent
due to institutional factors, e.g., licensing involves patenting whereas setting up an U-I RJV
may not, potentially making it easier to ￿nd another partner for a RJV relative to a licensee
hence di⁄ering outside options.
2.1 Di⁄erent outside options
The ￿rm can perform research and develop the idea: with probability pa development is
successful and the ￿rm obtains pro￿t, ￿ (net of development costs). The ￿rm￿ s expected
2payo⁄is pa￿. The university obtains nothing in this case so its payo⁄is 0 (Go-it alone branch
in Figure 1). In the case of technology transfer, the ￿rm can pursue with the university
the ￿ licensing￿option. If the university declines then the ￿rm proceeds alone and obtains
payo⁄ pa￿ and the university obtains 0. If the university accepts to transfer knowledge to
the ￿rm, then the ￿rm and the university together bargain over the terms of the transfer
price (license fee), L. The ￿rm buys the knowledge from the university and bears the cost
of development to bring it to market. It is assumed that, because of this interaction, the
probability of successful development by the ￿rm increases, pl > pa, i.e., interaction with the
university is bene￿cial. Payo⁄s are then pl￿ ￿ L for the ￿rm and L for the university. Note
that the di⁄erence pl ￿pa can be interpreted as a notion of the ￿rm￿ s absorptive capacity or
learning capability due to technology transfer (licensing branch). Alternatively, the ￿rm can
invite the university to participate in an U-I RJV to exploit the innovation together. If the
university declines the o⁄er it obtains a fraction of the value of the innovation, ￿V , ￿ 2 [0;1].
In particular, ￿ = 0 can be interpreted as a situation where the university has not interest
in developing the innovation any further or, as a situation where the knowledge discovered
by the university is at such an embryonic state that it is not possible to achieve its social
value; ￿ = 1 corresponds to the case where the university can engage in further development
(either on its own, or, by creating a spin-o⁄, or, joining forces with another ￿rm so that the
social value of the discovery is captured); intermediate values of ￿ are interpreted similarly.
If the university accepts the o⁄er of cooperation, then together with the ￿rm it has to decide
(bargain) on the division of the pro￿t; i.e., they have to decide on a share s. (U-I RJV
branch). In this case, let pu denote the probability that the university adapts the discovery
to the ￿rm￿ s needs successfully. Assuming that the probabilities pu and pl are independent,
the probability of success of the U-I RJV is [1 ￿ (1 ￿ pl)(1 ￿ pu)] = pl + pu ￿ plpu ￿ p:
Next, I proceed to solve the game. First, I deal with the two instances where the ￿rm
and the university bargain either on the license fee, L, or, on the division of pro￿t, s. I use
the simple Nash Bargaining solution to determine L and s.
In the case of licensing the Nash product is (pl￿ ￿ L ￿ pa￿)(L ￿ 0). Maximizing this
with respect to L yields L￿ =
(pl￿pa)￿
2 : Using L￿ in the relevant payo⁄s gives for the ￿rm,
￿f = (pl + pa)(￿=2), and for the university, ￿u = (pl ￿ pa)(￿=2). In the case of the U-I
RJV the Nash product is (ps￿ ￿ pa￿)[p(1 ￿ s)￿ ￿ ￿V ]. Maximizing with respect to s
gives s￿ =
(pa+p)￿￿￿V
2p￿ , where p = pl + pu ￿ plpu. Using s￿ in the relevant payo⁄s results in
￿f =
(pa+p)￿￿￿V
2 and ￿u =
(p￿pa)￿+￿V
2 . It is then straightforward to solve for the SPE of this
game. The following proposition summarizes (the proof is in the appendix.)
Proposition 1 The ￿rm chooses not to develop alone; the university and ￿rm engage in
technology transfer. In particular, there are two types of equilibrium: type A occurring for
(p￿pa)￿ < ￿V; with the university and the ￿rm engaging in licensing and type B occurring for
3(p￿pa)￿ > ￿V , where the university and the ￿rm engage in licensing if pu(1￿pl) < ￿(V=￿)
while they enter into an U-I RJV if pu(1 ￿ pl) > ￿(V=￿_ );and in addition ￿ ￿ ￿V:
Thus a U-I RJV forms when the pro￿t is at least as big as the social value of the innovation
weighted by the state of knowledge (￿ ￿ ￿V ). This is due to the reward structure in the
two channels of technology transfer and the structure of the outside options. In addition,
note that (see also Figure 2) for smaller values of ￿ the area of an U-I RJV increases which
means that for more embryonic states of innovation the U-I RJV is preferred to licensing.2
Moreover, for given ￿ the area of cooperation increases for higher pro￿t, ￿, or lower social
value, V .
Figure 2: Type B equilibrium (see Proposition 1)
2.2 Equal outside options
In this section I use the same game structure as in the preceding section the only di⁄erence
being that now the outside options for the university in case it declines technology transfer
are the same, and equal to ￿V (due to institutional factors as mentioned previously). The
game tree is thus modi￿ed as shown in Figure 3.
2In the limit, as ￿ ! 0, the U-I RJV is the only outcome.
4Figure 3: Equal outside options
In line with the previous section, in the case of licensing the Nash product is now (pl￿ ￿
L￿pa￿)(L￿￿V ) yielding L￿ =
(pl￿pa)￿+￿V
2 . Using this the payo⁄s become ￿f = pl￿￿L￿ =
(pl+pa)￿￿￿V
2 for the ￿rm and ￿u = L￿ =
(pl￿pa)￿+￿V
2 for the university. The U-I RJV branch
remains the same as in section 2.1. It is then straightforward to establish the following result
(the detailed derivation is in the Appendix).
Proposition 2 In the case of equal outside options there are two types of equilibrium out-
come:
Type 1, where the ￿rm develops alone; for this to occur it is su¢ cient that (p ￿ pa)￿ < ￿V ;
Type 2, where the ￿rm o⁄ers the university a U-I RJV and the university accepts; this occurs
for (p ￿ pa)￿ ￿ ￿V .
So in contrast to the case of di⁄erent outside options there are now instances where the
university rejects licensing. In fact, licensing is never part of an equilibrium. Either a U-I
RJV forms or independent development occurs in equilibrium. This is clearly due to the
fact that the outside options are the same for the university; as a result, the university would
always prefer the U-I RJV because of the sharing in the pro￿ts and the decision of the ￿rm
is guided by the relative size of expected pro￿t to social value.
3 Concluding Remarks
The simple model I have presented in this paper, explores some of the conditions that explain
the choice of technology transfer channel available to a ￿rm, in particular, whether the ￿rm
will opt for licensing from a university or whether it will form a collaborative venture with
the university. It turns out that whether the outside options for the university are the
same or not is a driving force in this choice. I should stress at this point that the paper
has only considered two possible options of technology transfer out of many (mentioned in
the Introduction). Further research is needed to address the full choice of options available,
combine this with the extant empirical evidence and draw policy implications.
54 Appendix
4.1 Proof of Proposition 1
I solve the game backwards by starting with the nodes where the university makes a choice.
RJV branch Compare payo⁄s
(p￿pa)￿+￿V
2 with ￿V . So,
(p￿pa)￿+￿V
2 ? ￿V or, (p ￿ pa) =
(pl+pu￿plpu￿pa)￿ ? ￿V . Two cases to consider depending on whether (p￿pa)￿ ? ￿V (i) if
(p￿pa)￿ ￿ ￿V , university accepts the o⁄er to participate in RJV and (ii) if (p￿pa)￿ < ￿V ,
university rejects RJV.
Licensing branch The university compares payo⁄s (pl ￿ pa)(￿=2) with 0. So, given the
assumption pl > pa, (pl ￿ pa)(￿=2) > 0, hence the university never rejects the demand for a
licence by the ￿rm; the ￿ No￿branch is dominated.
Next, I consider what the ￿rm will do, given the university￿ s optimal play as described
above.
There are two cases to consider depending on what the university does at the RJV node,
i.e. whether (p ￿ pa)￿ ? ￿V .
Case A (p ￿ pa)￿ < ￿V . The ￿rm has to consider the following payo⁄s from the three
available actions: pa￿;pa￿;(pl+pa)(￿=2). So, I need to check whether (pl+pa)(￿=2) ? pa￿.
Given the assumption that pl > pa, (pl + pa)(￿=2) > pa￿ so the ￿rm chooses to go for
a license. The equilibrium in this case is for the ￿rm to ask the university to license its
knowledge and the university to accept.
Case B (p ￿ pa)￿ ￿ ￿V (university accepts to participate in RJV if asked to do so).






2 ￿ pa￿, given that pl > pa
(by assumption). Further, as (p ￿ pa)￿ ￿ ￿V , it is also the case that
(pa+p)￿￿￿V
2 > pa￿.









2 ) (p ￿ pl)￿ ? ￿V ) pu(1 ￿ pl) ?
￿(V=￿). Thus, if pu(1 ￿ pl) > ￿(V=￿) and, in addition, ￿ ￿ ￿V , the RJV will form and if
pu(1 ￿ pl) < ￿(V=￿) a licensing contract will be preferred.
4.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Solving the game backwards, at the university subgame and the RJV branch there are two
cases: (i) if (p ￿ pa)￿ ￿ ￿V , the university accepts the U-I RJV, (ii) if (p ￿ pa)￿ < ￿V ,
it rejects it. Note that p = pl + pu ￿ plpu. In the licensing branch
(pl￿pa)￿+￿V
2 ? ￿V )
(pl ￿ pa)￿ + ￿V ? 2￿V ) (pl ￿ pa) ? ￿(V=￿). Hence, if (pl ￿ pa)￿ ￿ ￿V the university
accepts licensing; if (pl ￿ pa)￿ < ￿V it rejects licensing. Note that (p ￿ pa) > (pl ￿ pa).
Next, consider the Firm subgame. There are a number of cases to check depending on how
the university responds at the subgames it moves:
61. U will reject both licensing and the U-I RJV i⁄(pl￿pa)￿ < ￿V and (p￿pa)￿ < ￿V ;
given that (p￿pa) > (pl ￿pa) it is su¢ cient to (p￿pa)￿ < ￿V: So, the ￿rm develops alone
and obtains pa￿, while the university is not o⁄ered any option in the SPE and thus obtains
0 (type 1 equilibrium).
2. U accepts U-I RJV, U rejects licensing if (p￿pa)￿ ￿ ￿V and (pl ￿pa)￿ < ￿V , which
is equivalent to (pl ￿ pa) < ￿(V=￿) < (p ￿ pa) . The ￿rm has to compare the following




2 > pa￿ ) (p ￿ pa) > ￿(V=￿). So the
equilibrium outcome here is for the ￿rm to o⁄er the university the U-I RJV and for the U
to accept, U-I RJV is the outcome (type 2 equilibrium).
3. U will accept either option if o⁄ered by the ￿rm; this requires that both (p￿pa)￿ ￿ ￿V
and (pl ￿ pa)￿ ￿ ￿V hold, and as above it is su¢ cient that (pl ￿ pa)￿ ￿ ￿V holds. So the




2 . So U-I RJVs
preferred by the ￿rm over licensing and go-it-alone. The equilibrium here is for the ￿rm
to o⁄er the university a U-I RJV and the university to accept, so U-I RJV is the outcome
(type 2 equilibrium).
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